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The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for
Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal Courts
The professional conduct of attorneys is challenged today per-
haps more than ever before. Such challenges undoubtedly serve to
educate practitioners in the profession's ethical canons and produce
closer adherence to ethical principles. But the increase in challenges
has a darker side as well. The motion to disqualify counsel is an
especially effective litigation device. It can delay a trial, embarrass
an opponent, and, if successful, deprive an adversary of his chosen
and well-prepared counsel.' Punctilious enforcement of the canons
is often but disguised harassment of one's opponent. This problem
has become serious because the modern corporate law firm, with its
large and fluid membership and clientele, tends naturally to pro-
duce both real and apparent conflicts of interest.2 Apparent con-
flicts of interest can be seized upon by unscrupulous or overzealous
counsel and used to bludgeon an opposing party and his counsel,
whose actions may have been entirely innocent.3
The availability of appeal from the trial judge's ruling on the
motion to disqualify offers further prospect for delay and harass-
ment. Yet because of the potentially serious effects of an erroneous
order disqualifying or refusing to disqualify counsel, there is much
force to the argument that immediate appeal is necessary in order
to settle the issue justly and efficiently, once and for all. At present,
the majority of the circuits hold orders granting and denying such
motions appealable by right.4 Recent cases indicate, however, that
I Courts have also recognized that application of harsh disqualification tests might make
it difficult for some parties to obtain competent counsel in highly specialized fields, Laskey
Bros., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955), and that attorneys
might be closed out of their legal specialty. Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit
Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954). See Note, Disqualification of Attorneys
for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 916, 928 (1955).
1 See Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Silver Chrysler Motor, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1974).
3 See, e.g., Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 259-60, 265 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965).
Orders granting disqualification motions have long been held appealable. See, e.g.,
New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1106 (10th Cir. 1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262
(5th Cir. 1976); Brown v. Miller, 286 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1923). As for orders denying disquali-
fication, eight circuits now hold them appealable. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974); Greene v. Singer Co., 509 F.2d 750 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Mackeithan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
557 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1977); Tomlinson v. Florida Iron & Metal Co., 291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.
1961); Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 534 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1976); Schloetter v.
Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1976); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566
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the appealability of orders denying motions to disqualify is again
controverted, 5 largely because of the volume of appeals6 and their
potential for abuse.
F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Fullmer v. Harper, 517 F.2d 20, 21 (10th Cir. 1975). Two circuits
have held such orders unappealable. See Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC,
546 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1964), clarified,
370 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1966). Community Broadcasting only rejected appeals from orders
denying motions to disqualify counsel on ethical, as opposed to statutory, grounds, avoiding
overturning circuit precedent. See Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 454 F.2d 1036, 1038
n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). The court reiterated the distinction
in In re Investigation before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 605 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Its rationale was that "the situation differs materially [from disqualification solely on ethical
grounds] where the disqualification was predicated 'additionally upon significant impinge-
ment on a specific legislative policy'." Impingements on statutory schemes are, however, not
so different from violations of ethical canons in their practical effects as to require different
appellate treatment.
By comparison, state courts use varying procedures to obtain direct appellate review of
orders denying motions for disqualification of counsel. E.g., Meehan v. Hopps, 45 Cal. 2d 213,
288 P.2d 267 (1955) (denial deemed denial of injunction and thus appealable under state law);
Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 (La. Ct. of App.) (appeal taken on certiorari), writ
refused, 253 La. 59, 216 So. 2d 307 (1968); Kurbitz v. Kurbitz, 77 Wash. 2d 943, 468 P.2d 673
(1970) (appeal taken on certiorari). See 38 Tax. L. REV. 792 (1960), comparing the ruling in
Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959), with Texas
state procedure.
In addition to being rejected outright by the District of Columbia Circuit, Community
Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the rule permitting
appeal of right from disqualification denials has been criticized by the First Circuit, Grinnell
Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595, 598 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); and the
Third Circuit, where the rule allowing appeals supposedly was settled, has called the issue a
"close one." Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
925 (1972). Courts that follow Silver Chrysler have refused to apply the Silver Chrysler rule
in a stockholder's derivative suit, Glenn v. Arkansas Best Corp., 525 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1975),
and in a class action suit. Handwerger v. Ginsberg, 519 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1975).
More significantly, the Second Circuit has emphasized that it will reverse disqualifica-
tion denials only in cases involving injury to the moving party and suggested that it might
limit appealability to such as well. See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 676-77
(2d Cir. 1976); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1139 (2d Cir. 1975). There is
even sentiment among some Second Circuit judges that the time may be near for en banc
reconsideration of the Silver Chrysler decision. See Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d
Cir. 1977); Van Graafeiland, Lawyer's Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View (pt. II), 178
N.Y.L.J. No. 13, July 30, 1977, at 1.
' Recent Second Circuit cases include Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
No. 77-7387 (2d Cir., Nov. 7, 1977); Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v.
Sloan, 535 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1976); J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir.
1975); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuti-
cals, 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639
(2d Cir. 1975).
Recent Third Circuit cases include Ackerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539 (3d Cir.
1977); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976); Kroungold v. Triester,
521 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1975); American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1975).
Recent Fifth Circuit cases include Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d
83 (5th Cir. 1976).
All other circuits except the First have faced such appeals, though in lesser number.
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This comment examines the appealability of orders denying
disqualification in the federal courts. The cornerstone of federal
appellate jurisdiction is the final judgment rule,7 which, as codified
in section 1291 of the Judicial Code, allows appeal "from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . .except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."' Condi-
tioning appealability on a final judgment serves several purposes.
Consolidating review of all the issues of a case in a single, compre-
hensive proceeding avoids piecemeal review and the attendant
"mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice,"9 and is thought
to promote better-informed decisions."0 The rule also reduces the
number of issues to be considered on appeal because many potential
points of appeal are corrected in the course of trial, prove nonpreju-
dicial, or are mooted by the outcome. The final judgment rule can
nevertheless lead to unjust results or inefficiencies in certain cir-
cumstances. Statutory and judicial exceptions have therefore been
created to mitigate its effects. Because orders denying motions to
disqualify counsel are obviously not final decisions on the merits of
the lawsuit, they must meet the requirements of one of these excep-
tions in order to be appealable. The exceptions are generally of two
types: those allowing appeal of right, and those allowing discretion-
ary appeal.
I. DIRECT APPEAL OF RIGHT: THE Cohen COLLATERAL ORDER
DOCTRINE
The only arguably applicable exception" to the final judgment
See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.06, at 105-07 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE'S]. The importance of finality has recently been reemphasized in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
9 Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).
10 See, e.g., Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 180-81 (1955); Heike
v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1910); McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891); 9
MooRE's, supra note 7, 110.07 at 107-11. For historical analysis of the final judgment rule,
see Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
1 The language of Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153, 154 (1964)
(Black, J.), might seem to expand appellate jurisdiction to any question "fundamental to the
further conduct of the case." An exception phrased so broadly would eliminate the final
judgment rule altogether. Few significant court orders cannot be characterized as
"fundamental to the further conduct of the case," including orders concerning discovery,
admission of evidence, and challenges to the jury.
The Gillespie opinion cannot support appeals by right of orders denying disqualification,
however, because the reasoning of the case is fairly confused. It must be either rejected or
reinterpreted. The Court upheld the assumption of jurisdiction by the court of appeals, noting
the difficulty of the question and saying, "We cannot say that the court of appeals chose
wrongly under the circumstances." Id. at 153. The Court also noted that the petitioner's
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rule allowing appeal of right from orders denying disqualification is
the collateral order exception announced by the Supreme Court in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.1 2 In Silver Chrysler Ply-
mouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.1 3 and Tomlinson v. Florida
Iron & Metal Co.,'1 the Second and Fifth Circuits, respectively,
relied squarely on Cohen in holding that disqualification denials
are immediately appealable under section 1291. The opinions in
those cases, however, are short on analysis; they do not specify the
characteristics of such orders that were thought to bring them
within the Cohen exception. In Silver Chrysler the court simply
asserted that "all three prerequisites of Cohen are met."'5 A more
careful analysis reveals that denials of disqualification motions do
not meet the Cohen criteria, and that strong policy reasons dis-
favor allowing appeals of right from disqualification denials.
claims "are not formally severable so as to make the court's order unquestionably appealable
as to them." Id. This would imply that the court of appeals had discretion whether to hear
the appeal. This approach is dubious; appeals under § 1291 are appeals of right, not subject
to the discretion of the courts of appeals. The court of appeals' determination is subject to
review by the Supreme Court.
Dubious as this first proposition may be, the Court compounded the confusion by saying:
It is true that if the District Judge had certified the case to the Court of Appeals under
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1958 ed.), the appeal unquestionably would have been proper; in
the light of the circumstances we believe that the Court of Appeals properly imple-
mented the same policy Congress sought to promote in § 1292 (b) by treating this
obviously marginal case as final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958 ed.).
Id. at 154. This dictum seems to imply that if an order certifiable for interlocutory appeal
under § 1292(b) by the district judge is not so certified, the court of appeals may at its
discretion hear the appeal anyway. Such an interpretation of § 1292(b) (called "clearly
incorrect" in Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
88 HAxv. L. REv. 607, 614 (1975)) would abrogate the requirement of certification, making
appealable under § 1292(b) whatever the appellate court chooses to hear, a position clearly
contrary to the statute.
Moreover, this interpretation flatly contradicts the Court's previous conclusion that the
order was appealable under § 1291. If, as stated by the Court, the order involved in Gillespie
would "unquestionably" have been a proper subject for § 1292(b) appeal, then it could not
also have been a final order appealable under § 1291, because § 1292(b) permits appeal only
of orders "not otherwise appealable under this section."
Thus, the Gillespie opinion, which admits to the impossibility of devising a rule to judge
finality, cannot serve as a valid basis for enlarging appeals beyond the strictures of Cohen
and its counterparts. See 379 U.S. at 167-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Some commentators, e.g., 9 MooRE's, supra note 7, 110.12, at 150-52, have reinter-
preted Gillespie to create a separate exception to the finality principle, granting the appellate
courts the power to hear the merits of an appeal after time and resources have already been
expended on hearing the jurisdictional issue. This discretion would give no right of appeal to
litigants, and could be exercised only where appealability was a close question and the issue
"fundamental" to the case below. So interpreted, Gillespie does not support appeals by right
of disqualification denials.
12 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
13 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974).
' 291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
's 496 F.2d at 805.
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A. The Cohen Requisites
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.," a diversity suit,
involved an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion to
require the plaintiff to post bond for payment of expenses in a stock-
holder derivative suit, as required by state statute. The court of
appeals accepted the appeal and reversed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Applying a "practical rather than a technical
construction"' 7 to section 1291's requirement of a final decision, the
Court held the order appealable on the ground that the decision fell
within a "small class which finally determine claims of right separa-
ble from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too impor-
tant to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case
is adjudicated.' 8
Four requisites of section 1291 appealability can be distilled
from the above passage and other language in the opinion. The-order
must be (1) collateral-the issues bearing on the order must be
essentially unrelated to the issues of the main dispute;19 (2) conclu-
sive-the order must be final, neither tentative nor incomplete; 20 (3)
1' 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
17 Id. at 546. The three cases cited in Cohen to illustrate the "practical" construction of
the finality statute provide little guidance as to the Court's meaning. Bank of Columbia v.
Sweeny, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 567 (1828), and Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940),
both hewed strictly to the final judgment rule. United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U.S.
411 (1925) is analogous to the exception of rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and represents the policies behind that rule rather than the Cohen doctrine.
A true pragmatic approach to finality might be to treat those orders as final which
effectively dispose of litigation, even though not terminating it in a technical sense. This
approach would not support the collateral order exception in most circumstances, including
those in Cohen. It would, however, provide strong support for such decisions as Forgay v.
Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 200 (1848); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del
Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950); Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950)
(per curiam); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 (1967) (death knell doctrine); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962). See Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. Rv. 89 (1975). This pragmatic approach would not support
appeals of orders denying motions for disqualification because such orders do not terminate
the litigation, either practically or technically.
337 U.S. at 546.
" But this order of the District Court did not make any step toward final disposition of
the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment.- . . . We conclude that
the matters embraced in the decision appealed from are not of such an interlocutory
nature as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of this case.
Id. The issue was further described as "not an ingredient of the cause of action." Id. at
546-47.
2 The effect of [28 U.S.C. § 1291] is to disallow appeal from any decision which is
tentative, informal or incomplete. Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not
one of intervention. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive,
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impracticable of appeal from final judgment-the asserted right
"will have been lost, probably irreparably" if review is delayed;2
and (4) of public importance-the order should involve "a serious
and unsettled question," and not simply the exercise of trial court
discretion.22 It is unclear, however, whether all of these requirements
have survived the Supreme Court decisions that have been handed
down since Cohen. The Court failed in many subsequent cases to
make explicit the factors it considers in deciding whether interlocu-
tory orders are appealable under section 1291.23 Some decisions
mention none of the four Cohen requisites;2 4 others mention only two
or three. 5 In its most recent collateral order decision the Court
insisted on the first three requisites enumerated above,2 which rep-
resent the bare minimum that must be retained unless the Cohen
doctrine is to undermine completely the final decision rule. Some
courts have continued to require "public importance," even
there may be no intrusion by appeal. But the District Court's action upon this applica-
tion was concluded and closed and its decision final in that sense before the appeal was
taken.
Id. at 546.
11 "When [the time of final disposition of the case] comes, it will be too late effectively
to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will
have been lost, probably irreparably." Id.
22 The appealed claim was described as "too important to be denied review." Id. The
Cohen court defined "importance" in terms of whether the appeal presents a "serious and
unsettled question," as opposed to involving "the exercise of discretion":
[W]e do not mean that every order fixing security is subject to appeal. Here it is the
right to security that presents a serious and unsettled question. If the right were admit-
ted or clear and the order involved only an exercise of discretion as to the amount of
security . . . appealability would present a different question.
Id. at 547. The distinction captures the essence of the issue. If, in a class of orders, factual
variations will be many and significant and the legal determination will depend upon the
weighing of conflicting considerations, no individual case will involve "serious and unsettled"
questions, at least once the proper standards to be applied have been established.
This "importance" is referred to in this comment as "public importance" in order to
distinguish it from the importance of the question to the parties themselves. The Cohen
decision plainly had a "public importance" beyond the individual action.
Perhaps this may be attributed to the difficulty of harmonizing the conflicting tensions
between justice and judicial economy. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.
507, 511 (1950).
2, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying reduction of bail); Roberts v. United
States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (per curiam) (order denying motion to proceed in
forma pauperis).
2 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (order rejecting criminal defense of
double jeopardy); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (order requiring class
action defendants to bear ninety percent of notice expenses held appealable); Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Columbiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950) (order dissolving
foreign attachment of a vessel held appealable).
2 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
" See, e.g., Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1976); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett,
519 F.2d 595, 597-98 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin
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though the Court has not emphasized it in recent cases.28 For pres-
ent purposes, it is not necessary to determine whether "public im-
portance" remains a necessary element (although, as argued below,
there are sound policy reasons for retaining it) because orders deny-
ing attorney disqualification do not satisfy the Cohen test of imprac-
ticability of appeal from final judgment, let alone the test of public
importance. 9
1. Impracticability of Appeal from Final Judgment.
a. Harm to the movant. It is plausible to argue, as did the
court in Silver Chrysler,'" that the harm to the movant from an
improper denial of his motion to disqualify cannot be rectified com-
pletely by an appeal from final judgment. In Cohen and its Supreme
Court progeny, however, the possibility of any relief, not merely the
adequacy or completeness of the relief, was at stake. The right of a
litigant to be protected from the unethical conduct of an opponent's
counsel can be vindicated by appeal from final judgment. Unlike
cases involving the right to compel the posting of pretrial security,3
the right to reduction of bail,32 or double jeopardy,33 disqualification
Aktiengesellschaft, 508 F.2d 399, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1974); General Motors Corp. v. City of New
York, 501 F.2d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 1974); IBM Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 298 (2d
Cir. 1973); Donlon Indus. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Fried,
386 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1967); Bancroft Navigation Co. v. Chadade S.S. Co., 349 F.2d 527,
529-30 (2d Cir. 1965); 9 MOORE'S, supra note 7, 110.10 at 133; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 101, at 509 n.36 (3d ed. 1976). See also West v. Zurhorst, 425
F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1970).
28 Perhaps the most conspicuous example is the Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), where Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the
majority did not even mention "public importance."
In one sense every case decided by the Court under its certiorari jurisdiction has the
requisite public importance. It is hardly likely that the Court would find the issue of appeala-
bility in a case important enough to grant certiorari, and then hold the issue of insufficient
public importance to warrant appeal. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring). This might account for the Court's lack of emphasis on the point, in contrast
to the circuit courts who must make a separate determination of public importance in judging
appealability.
21 However, both the "collateral" and the "conclusive" elements are present. Orders
regarding disqualification are collateral to the main cause in the sense that factual issues
bearing on disqualification are usually unrelated to the basic issues of the litigation. Although
the requirement of conclusiveness is less clearly met since the trial judge, upon further
evidence, might grant the motion later, see Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959), as a practical matter orders denying disqualification are not
"tentative, informal, or incomplete," but rather settle the issue, permanently barring appeal
or reconsideration. Rarely would such new evidence appear after the order that the judge
would change his mind.
- 496 F.2d 800, 805 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Greene v. Singer Co., 509 F.2d 750 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
1, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
31 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
1 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The other Supreme Court cases similarly
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denial cases involve the danger of prejudice to a party's conduct of
his lawsuit, especially where the ground for disqualification is the
possibility that opposing counsel will disclose the party's confid-
ences. Prejudice to the litigation, however, can be corrected by a
new trial, coupled if necessary with replication of pretrial proceed-
ings. This remedy may be less than ideal from the movant's point
of view, both because damage from an attorney's improper disclo-
sure of confidences perhaps might never be fully corrected,34 and
because retrial is costly and inconvenient. The disclosure problem,
however, is no more curable by an immediate appeal; the challenged
attorney will generally have had ample opportunity to disclose all
that he knows before he is disqualified upon appeal. The problem
of expense and inconvenience of waiting for final judgment 35 has
never been considered a sufficient ground for deviating from the
final judgment rule. As the Supreme Court commented in Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Association,3 a mandamus case, "trial may be of
several months duration and may be correspondingly costly and
inconvenient. But that inconvenience is one which we must take it
Congress contemplated in providing that only final judgments
should be reviewable. '37
Erroneous orders denying disqualification are similar to erro-
neous discovery orders. Erroneous discovery orders may expose ma-
terials that the party had a right to keep confidential or may deny
a party access to information needed for conducting a fair trial.
involve situations in which there was no possibility of review. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (order requiring a class action defendant to pay 90% of notice
costs, where the suit was likely to be dropped if representative plaintiffs had to pay the costs);
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950) (order
releasing a vessel from foreign attachment and thereby destroying the in rem jurisdiction of
the court). As the Court said in another context, "Only in the limited class of cases where
denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual's
claims have we allowed exceptions to this principle." United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530,
533 (1971) (emphasis added).
1, Harmer Drive-In Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 239 F.2d 555, 558 n.3 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Clark, C.J., dissenting).
11 The rhetorical construction of the Silver Chrysler opinion makes it apparent that the
"grave consequences to the losing party" from denial of its motion for disqualification consis-
ted primarily of uncertainty, paperwork, and legal time:
By holding such an order directly appealable, we eliminate the uncertainties (and
the paperwork) attendant to resorting to § 1292(b) and/or § 1651. Since the ultimate
objective is to bring before an appellate court an important question which, if unre-
solved, might well taint a trial, why should not this question be presented before judicial
and attorney time may have been needlessly expended?
496 F.2d at 806. Such inconveniences do not satisfy the impracticability of appeal from final
judgment standard.
31 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
" Id. at 30.
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They cannot be remedied after final judgment except by a new trial
and perhaps new pretrial proceedings as well. Nevertheless, courts
have generally held discovery orders unappealable, 8 reasoning that
''since review is ultimately available upon appeal from the final
judgment in the action, unnecessary intermediate appeals only
serve to delay trial and to provide an opportunity for harassment
and abuse . ... -1
b. Harm to the judicial system. It might be said that a kind
of harm that cannot be remedied on appeal is the injury to the
judicial system caused by the loss of public confidence in the courts
when a lawyer who should be disqualified is allowed to participate
in the trial. One might argue that direct appeal of orders disqualify-
ing counsel is necessary because the public appearance of impro-
priety cannot be remedied upon appeal from final judgment. This
argument is unpersuasive, for at least three reasons.
First, it seems doubtful that public confidence in the legal sys-
tem would be much affected by allowing disqualification denials to
stand until corrected on appeal from final judgment, especially if
alternative modes of review are available for more important or
egregious cases." Although there is some truth in the oft-repeated
idea that "[t]he stature of the profession and the courts, and the
esteem in which they are held, are dependent upon the complete
absence of even a semblance of improper conduct, '41 the argument
11 See Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1974), and cases cited
therein; 9 MOORE'S, supra note 7, 110.13[2], at 153-59. See also Alexander v. United States,
201 U.S. 117 (1906); Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1969); American Express
Warehousing v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Covey
Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965)
(appeal granted because appellant was not a party and therefore could not challenge the final
judgment).
" Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1077 (2d Cir. 1974).
Orders granting and orders denying motions for disqualification differ sharply with re-
spect to the possibility of obtaining relief upon appeal from final judgment. Unlike disqualifi-
cation denials, orders granting disqualification are subject to appellate review after final
judgment. If, after the disqualification, the party wins the case, the disqualification becomes
moot despite the cost that disqualification imposed on the party. If the party whose attorney
is disqualified loses the case, then the error would be viewed as non-prejudicial, except
possibly in the most extreme circumstances. This is because, to prove prejudice, it would be
necessary to establish that replacement counsel had been so incompetent and unprepared
relative to former counsel as to have affected the case. Such a situation is improbable. As
the court commented in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), "A
delayed appeal of this order of disqualification would be no appeal, for if plaintiff is required
to obtain new counsel and try this suit before appealing the order of disqualification, the order
will have become moot." Id. at 402.
See generally Section II infra.
' Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973).
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almost surely exaggerates the public's awareness of disqualification
disputes.
Second, it is difficult to see how the appearance of impropriety
can justify immediate appeal when, despite dicta to the contrary, 2
merely apparent impropriety is often insufficient to warrant dis-
qualification. 3 Although many courts speak in disqualification
cases of avoiding the "appearance of impropriety," this should not
be taken to mean that apparent impropriety, in the absence of
actual misconduct, is an adequate ground for disqualification. The
"appearance of impropriety" language is taken from Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility." The Canons and explanatory
Ethical Considerations, however, are the aspirational objectives of
the profession, stated in "general terms."45 The Disciplinary Rules,
which are "mandatory in character" and "state the minimum level
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action,"4 are more specific and do not require a lawyer
to turn down employment simply because his accepting it might
create some ill-defined "appearance of impropriety. 4 7 The most
42 See, e.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Indus.,
Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973); Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp.
637, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1974). In each case there was a substantial risk of disclosure of confiden-
tial information.
'3 See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 616 (8th Cir. 1977); Woods
v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976) ("there must be at least a
reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety did in fact occur");
Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975); Ceramo, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals,
510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-Silver
Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 130 (1975). See also Note,
Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE
L.J. 917 (1955).
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry Canon 9 (1975): "A Lawyer Should Avoid
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."
45 Id. at 1 (Preamble and Preliminary Statement).
4, Id. The Code does not prescribe sanctions for violation of the disciplinary rules, but
such sanctions include disbarment, suspension from practice, and civil liability. Disqualifica-
tion from a particular suit is punitive, and thus has the effect of deterring violation. The
central purpose of disqualification, however, is not to punish the errant attorney, but to
protect the other party. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976). It may
be argued, then, that the relevance of the Code to disqualification proceedings is to serve as
a standard for judging the reasonable expectations and rights of parties, rather than as rules,
which, if broken, merit punishment.
,1 See Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification- Silver Chrysler Steers
in a New Direction, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 130, 141-45 (1975). Only one reported case has been
found in which a non-government attorney was disqualified in the absence of actual impro-
priety. W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961), afrd per curiam,
302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962). The more typical situation occurs where an actual impropriety
has been committed under one of the canons, and the court discusses the "appearance of
impropriety" as well. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1974) (Canon 9); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (Canon 4).
This might be interpreted as an attempt to soften the criticism of the attorney.
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common predicate for disqualification motions is not Canon 9, but
Canon 4, which states that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confi-
dences and Secrets of a Client."4 8 Under this canon, courts apply a
"substantial relationship" test. If an attorney's present case bears
a substantial relationship to an earlier case in which he represented
an opposing party, the court will infer the passing of confidential
information49 and disqualify the challenged counsel. That the
"substantial relationship" standard demands a close examination
of the attorney's behavior and is not satisfied by the mere
"appearance of impropriety" is attested by the Silver Chrysler case
itself. Defendant Chrysler Motors argued that a former junior asso-
ciate of its counsel should be disqualified from representing the
plaintiff on grounds of possible appearance of impropriety. The dis-
trict court rejected this standard and ruled that movant must show
that the attorney undertook "[a]ctual activities on specific cases"
from which it can reasonably be inferred that he gained information
of value to his present client. Indeed, the court noted, public con-
fidence in the legal system might be damaged if vague charges of
impropriety were permitted to "form the sole basis for an unjust
disqualification."51
Third, Cohen and its progeny do not suggest that by impracti-
cability of remedy the Court meant the difficulty of redressing the
harm suffered by anyone other than a party involved in the lawsuit.
For example, in Baker v. United States Steel Corp.,52 the Second
Circuit expressed concern that if the trial judge's ruling "ultimately
should turn out to have been erroneous, considerable harm could
result not only to appellants but also to the public interest in main-
taining the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings,"53 but never-
theless held the order, which related to discovery, unappealable.
Because "review is ultimately available upon appeal from final
judgment," the court reluctantly, but correctly, held itself
"powerless to act at this stage." 4
,1 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1975).
11 Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Redd v. Shell Oil
Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975); American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 984-
85 (3d Cir. 1975); Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1974); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
5o Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal granted, 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1975).
51 Id.
52 492 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1974).
5Id. at 1078.
11 Id. at 1079.
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2. Public Importance. Although the Supreme Court has not
placed much emphasis on the public importance branch of the
Cohen test in recent cases, strong reasons support its retention. The
Cohen doctrine has engendered an uncomfortably large family of
appealable orders" at a time when the policy justification for ap-
pealability by right has become less pressing. 6 Alternative modes
of review have developed since Cohen was decided-principally,
interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b) and liberalized use of the
writ of mandamus57-which are less disruptive to the litigation, yet
effectively mitigate the harshness of the final decision rule. Insist-
ence upon the public importance requisite would keep Cohen ap-
peals within reasonable bounds. This is because the public import-
ance requirement serves the function of distinguishing cases where
"a decision [on appeal] will settle a point once and for all" from
cases where a decision "will open the way for a flood of appeals
concerning the propriety of a district court's ruling on the facts of a
particular suit." 8 As the Second Circuit explained in Donlon Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Forte,59 a decision holding unappealable an order refus-
ing to require the plaintiff in a securities case to provide an under-
taking for defendant's costs:
Whether a court has power to require an undertaking is an issue
of law, and an appellate decision will settle the matter not
simply for the case in hand but for many others-as was nota-
bly true with the important issue in Cohen. In contrast, where
the question is the propriety of an exercise of discretion in
denying security, the factual variations are so numerous that
a judgment on appeal can do little to establish meaningful
standards. Furthermore, since review would be limited to
"abuse" of discretion, the likelihood of reversal is too negligible
to justify the delay and expense incident to an appeal and the
consequent burden on hardpressed appellate courts."
See Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1969) ("[appellants'] irresistible
impulse to invoke the 'collateral order' doctrine whenever the question of appealability ar-
ises"); Bancroft Navigation Co. v. Chadade S.S. Co., 349 F.2d 527, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1965); 9
MOORE'S, supra note 7, 110.10, at 133.
' See 9 MOORE'S, supra note 7, T 110.10, at 135-36, suggesting that the Interlocutory
Appeals Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970)),
the introduction of "supervisory mandamus," and the 1963 amendment to rule 54(b) have
made Cohen an unnecessary and undesirable exception.
17 See generally Section II infra.
Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770,
773 (2d Cir. 1972).
402 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 937. See also Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1976); Grinnell Corp.
v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595, 597-98 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
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The public importance criterion also accords with a reasonable
division of duties between trial and appellate courts. In making
factual judgments, or in applying general standards to particular
fact situations, the trial court's judgment should rarely be dis-
turbed. Only where a legal issue of general applicability is con-
cerned is the appellate court decidedly more competent. This divi-
sion of duties, reflected in the "clearly erroneous" and "incorrect"
standards for reversal, should also be reflected in the standards
for direct appealability.
To determine whether disqualification denials generally involve
matters of "public importance," it is therefore necessary to deter-
mine the extent to which trial judge rulings on motions to disqualify
involve the exercise of discretion. The majority view, challenged
only by the Fifth Circuit"1 and unheeded dicta in the Third,"2 is that
district judges have wide discretion in granting or denying motions
for disqualification. Such orders will be reversed only on a showing
of "abuse of discretion," whatever the procedural context. 3 The
factual situations out of which disqualification motions arise tend
to be individuated and complex." It may be necessary to distinguish
" Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976). Woods reflected
a switch in a single year from the majority view clearly espoused in In re Gopman, 531 F.2d
262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
12 See American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1975):
We have serious reservations, however, whether our scope of review is limited to finding
an abuse of discretion in disqualification cases such as this. It appears that in issue in
these cases is the purely legal question of whether two allegedly adverse representations
-are so intertwined that it can be said that in the former representation the attorney
"might have acquired" material "substantially related" to the subject matter of the
second representation. Determination of that question leaves little leeway for the exer-
cise of discretion.
Id. at 985 n.3. The Third Circuit continued to apply the "abuse of discretion" standard in
disqualification appeals in Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1975), while restating
American Roller's reservations. Id. at 765 n.2. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d
1085 (3d Cir. 1976), while not deciding the question of the appropriate standard of review,
commented that "in many contexts disqualification motions present purely legal issues,
subject to full appellate review." Id. at 1088. The Fifth Circuit was apparently persuaded,
for it cited American Roller in Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir.
1976).
" E.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Schloetter v.
Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d
1322, 1324-25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266
(5th Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975); Richardson v.
Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973);
Waters v. Western Co. of N. Am., 436 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir. 1971).
" See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., No. 77-7387 (2d Cir. Nov. 7,
1977) (facts presented and analyzed with "painstaking care"); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975);
Uniweld Products, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.2d. 992, 995 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968) ("the issues before the trial court were essentially issues of fact");
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between appearance of and actual impropriety, and to give each its
proper weight.6" The balancing of the parties' interests may turn on
very subtle aspects of the situation." Moreover, the records of dis-
qualification cases are often inadequate to allow careful appellate
review of trial judges' applications of ethical standards." In view of
the district judge's greater familiarity with the intricacies of the
case and the ramifications of the order, and because of the import-
ance of preserving the trial judge's control over the proceedings in
his court,68 his decision should be entitled to great deference.
Given that disqualification denials are discretionary in nature,
and therefore will not typically present "serious and unsettled"
questions,69 it is hard to identify any public importance element in
most such orders. The only conceivable basis for finding the requi-
site public importance lies in the generalized public interest in pro-
moting legal ethics. Recognizing that "it is difficult tp understand
how every order refusing to disqualify is 'important,'" the First
Circuit in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett0 speculated in similar vein that
interlocutory appeal had been granted by the Second Circuit in
Silver Chrysler because of "an overriding concern. . . for avoiding
any interim appearance of impropriety."' Such suggestions are
unpersuasive, however. That a general class of issues is of public
importance does not imply that any particular case in that class has
similar importance. Were it otherwise, every interlocutory order
implicating in some way an important policy concern-in other
words, virtually every interlocutory order-would be appealable by
right, provided that the other Cohen requisites were met. The argu-
ment also overstates the public awareness of disqualification litiga-
tion. Moreover, the substantive standard of disqualification re-
quires more than the mere appearance of impropriety." If public
confidence can survive representations having an appearance of
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (conclusion reached
after a thorough document-by-document analysis).
Waters v. Western Co. of N. Am., 436 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir. 1971).
Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1976).
17 See, e.g., Melamed v. I'fl Continental Baking Co., 534 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1976); Waters
v. Western Co. of N. Am., 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971).
Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530-31 (1824).
" This distinction, between orders presenting "serious and unsettled" questions and
those involving "the exercise of discretion," was the one made in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949). See note 22 supra.
10 Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
11 Id. at 597 n.4. The Grinnell court also speculated that the "importance" might be
found in the Silver Chrysler court's overriding concern for judicial economy. Id. at 598 n.4.
See note 73 infra.
2 See text and notes at notes 42-51 supra.
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impropriety, surely it can survive the appearance of impropriety in
the interim between the trial court's ruling and final judgment.
B. Policy Reasons for Rejecting Appeal of Right
It is simple to observe that some claims of attorney misconduct
will be well founded, and others factitious. It is not so simple for
the legal system to identify which are which. Great deference
should be accorded the decision of the district judge, whose expe-
rience in conducting litigation and familiarity with the particular
case generally enable him to decide the merits of a disqualification
motion fairly. Some mechanism must be available, however, to re-
view a blatantly incorrect order where special circumstances make
the consequences to the party unusually harsh.
Since the district judge's ruling may ultimately be reviewed by
the appellate court, it is tempting to permit the aggrieved party to
take an appeal immediately, so that the question of the attorney's
privilege to conduct-the litigation can be finally determined at the
outset. It is certainly unsettling, and perhaps prejudicial to the
parties, to leave such ethical challenges lingering in doubt. Never-
theless, it does not follow that immediate appeals of right are the
appropriate way to review disqualification orders. The right to im-
mediate appeal is a potent weapon for delay, and thus has adverse
consequences for judicial administration as well as for the opposing
party. The weapon is less disruptive, however, where disqualifica-
tion has been granted than where disqualification has been denied.
In the former situation, the lawsuit is already delayed while replace-
ment counsel prepares himself. The granting of the disqualification
motion, moreover, is persuasive evidence that there is some sub-
stantial reason for the challenge. Where the order in question denies
disqualification, however, an appeal might significantly delay the
trial and might be taken on wholly spurious grounds. Since appear-
ances of conflict of interest are common, it is a relatively easy mat-
ter to delay by a factitious, but plausible, argument for reversal.
Although the Second Circuit in Silver Chrysler was motivated
partly by the interests of judicial economy in deciding to grant
appeal of right to denials of motions for disqualification, 73 in prac-
tice such appeals are judicially uneconomical. This is not surprising
since the Cohen exception, in general, satisfies the public and pri-
73 "Since the ultimate objective is to bring before an appellate court an important ques-
tion, which, if unresolved, might well taint a trial, why should not this question be presented
before judicial and attorney time may have been needlessly expended?" Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, Inc., 496 F.2d 800, 806 (2d Cir. 1974).
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vate interest in speedy rectification at the expense of judicial econ-
omy.7 4 Of course, when a final judgment is overturned and a new
trial ordered because the trial court failed to disqualify an attorney,
hindsight will say that less court time would have been wasted had
an interlocutory appeal been taken. This is true, however, of any
erroneous interlocutory order that would be grounds for reversal.
The savings effected by interlocutory appeals in these rare cases are
greatly outweighed by the costs of permitting such appeals in the
more numerous cases where the issue is rightly decided or becomes
moot, settled, or inconsequential before final judgment.
Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc. 5 illustrates that appellate
courts can often make more discriminating judgments on interlocu-
tory issues if appeal is delayed until final judgment. Plaintiff was
represented at trial by its secretary and general counsel, who had
participated in the transactions at issue. Defendant moved to dis-
qualify him on the ground that he "would be" a witness in the trial.78
The district judge denied the motion for disqualification and the
case proceeded to final judgment. Had defendant won, there would
have been no appellate consideration of the disqualification issue.
But defendant lost and appealed, assigning the disqualification rul-
ing as one of several points of error. Though noting that the attor-
ney's "integrity, credibility, and professional status were inter-
twined inseparably with the issues of the case,"77 and that "doubts
should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testifying and against his
becoming or continuing as an advocate, 718 the Second Circuit never-
theless affirmed the judgment. Examination of the trial record
showed that the attorney had not testified and that he had
"scrupulously" avoided use of personal recollection in his summa-
tion to the jury. The court concluded that the district judge, in
, See Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1969):
Every interlocutory order involves, to some degree, a potential loss. That risk, how-
ever, must be balanced against the need for efficient federal judicial administration as
evidenced by the Congressional prohibition of piecemeal appellate litigation. To accept
the appellant's view is to invite the inundation of appellate dockets with what have
heretofore been regarded as nonappealable matters. It would constitute the courts of
appeals as second-stage motion courts reviewing pretrial applications of all non-party
witnesses alleging some damage because of the litigation.
Id. at 846.
, 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
" Disciplinary Rule DR 5-101 (B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
"A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or pending litigation if he knows or
it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness .... ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RusPONSimrrY 27 (1975).
" 434 F.2d at 568.
78 Id. at 569 (quoting Ethical Consideration 5-10 of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
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denying the motion, "did not abuse his discretion, and that subse-
quent occurrences at trial do not warrant reversal on this ground." 9
Had there been an interlocutory appeal, not only would the case
have been delayed and the courts burdened, but a costly and time-
consuming disqualification might have been ordered when hind-
sight showed that the remedy was unnecessary for a fair trial.
These considerations-the strain on appellate court dockets by
expansion of piecemeal review, the cessation of district court pro-
ceedings pending appeal, and the unrestricted opportunity which
interlocutory appeal affords parties for further costly harassment of
adversaries-counsel strongly against permitting appeal of right
from motions denying attorney disqualification. Unlike appeals
from orders granting disqualification, appeals from orders denying
disqualification afford virtually unlimited possibilities for abuse.
Disqualification denials should not be appealable as of right, not
only because they fail to meet the Cohen criteria, but also because
they are undesirable in practice.
C. Limited Appeal of Right
Dissatisfied with the practical results of its Silver Chrysler rule,
the Second Circuit has taken steps to cut back on the volume of
appellate litigation over attorney disqualification. In Lefrak v. Ara-
bian American Oil Co. ,8 the court refused to reverse the lower
court's decision not to disqualify, emphasizing that certain viola-
tions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are not grounds for
disqualification in the absence of such injury to the moving party
as would "taint" the trial.81 Though the parties had not raised the
issue, the court speculated that an order denying disqualification
might not be appealable at all in the absence of such injury and
taint. The rationale of Silver Chrysler, the court stated, applies only
where there is such taint as would lead to "a waste of attorney and
judicial trial time."8 The court repeated this characterization of
Silver Chrysler the following year in W. T. Grant Co. v. Haines.83
11 Id. at 567.
80 527 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1975).
81 Id. at 1139-40.
A2 Id. at 1139.
m 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976) (attorney accused of violating Canon 7 by communicating
directly with an opposing party):
While disqualification is clearly punitive insofar as [appellee] and its outside counsel
are concerned, its benefit to [appellant] is indeed questionable. The business of the
court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics of those
who practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before
it. . . . If [challenged counsel] is guilty of professional misconduct. . . the appropriate
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The Second Circuit's reinterpretation of Silver Chrysler has so
far affected only the standard of review, but the court's logic sug-
gests a new approach to appealability as well. Under this possible
new approach, appeal of right would lie only when an appellant
could prove "taint"-that the order below would seriously impair
his right to a fair trial. Appealability would thus be judged on a
case-by-case basis:8" when no "taint" is shown, appeal would not lie,
no matter how erroneous the order below. This approach would be
similar to that which the Second Circuit has taken to the appeala-
bility of orders granting consolidation of stockholders' actions. At
present, direct appeals from such orders are allowed only if the order
consolidates the action in such a way as effectively to deny a party
his due process right to prosecute his separate claim.85 The appeala-
bility determination involves a somewhat detailed examination of
the claims in the main case and the scope of the order. In a disquali-
fication case, the appellate court, under a "taint" doctrine, would
examine the claim to determine whether counsel's unethical behav-
ior prejudices the appellant's claim. The court would therefore have
to examine in some detail an appellant's proof of prospective in-
jury.86
There are several drawbacks to such an approach. 87 First, it is
doctrinally questionable, sharing most of the defects of the full
Silver Chrysler rule. The Cohen requisites of public importance and
impracticability of review from final judgment are lacking.8 The
artful movant, moreover, will continue to be able to force unwar-
forum is the Grievance Committee of the bar association.
Id. at 677.
" This seems to have been the original position of the Third Circuit. In Greene v. Singer
Co., 509 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972), the court said:
We do not hold that every ruling relating to conflict of interest by an attorney should
activate the Cohen rule. We decide only that these facts present compelling argument
that the "rights asserted in the action [are] too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself" to require a postponement of appellate consideration.
Id. at 751 (footnote omitted).
Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1973).
Cf. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (appeal of order
certifying class in a class action suit, under the doctrine in Herbst v. IT Corp., 495 F.2d
1308 (2d Cir. 1974), dismissed after lengthy discussion of the minimal injury to defendant
from the order).
" Indeed, Judge Friendly has recommended abandonment of the Garber approach; he
would deny all appeals of consolidation orders. In his view, halfway measures such as Garber
cannot correct the original mistake of granting appeals. Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521
F.2d 1354, 1363-64 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring).
By limiting appeals to cases involving serious injury to the movant, the courts could
move closer to satisfying the impracticability of final appellate review requisite. However, the
remaining cases would still lack the element of impossibility of rectification evident in Cohen
and its progeny.
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ranted expenditure of judicial and opponent resources. The focus of
argument will simply shift from the substantive issue, under Silver
Chrysler, to the threshold question of "taint." Though the latter
inquiry is of lesser scope, it is unlikely that the hoped-for savings of
court and party time would be of much magnitude. Furthermore,
the flexibility of the rule would encourage litigation. As the District
of Columbia Circuit noted in another context, "exemptions to the
final judgment rule . .. should be indulged only in clearly and
narrowly defined areas to maintain the wholesome deterrence of the
final judgment rule." 9 Only a clean and categorical rule can avoid
the dangers of a lengthy and uncertain analysis of the appealability
question."0 The excesses of the Silver Chrysler rule would be better
corrected by replacing it with a clear judgment against immediate
appealability by right.91
II. DISCRETIONARY MODES OF REvmiw: SECTION 1292(B) AND
MANDAMUS
The problem with recognizing a class of interlocutory orders as
appealable under section 1291 is that all appeals of orders of that
class then come within the mandatory jurisdiction of the courts of
appeals. Litigants are thus given the opportunity to protract the
proceedings, burdening the judicial system and imposing costs and
delays on the opposing parties. The potential for abusing the right
to immediate appeal of orders denying disqualification is so great
that appealability of right should be rejected. Discretionary modes
of review, on the other hand, enable courts to pick and choose par-
ticularly worthy cases from among the general class, and thus are
not nearly as susceptible to abuse. Possible discretionary modes of
review from orders denying disqualification are (1) interlocutory
appeal under section 1292(b), and (2) the writ of mandamus.
A. Interlocutory Appeal under Section 1292(b)
In 1958 Congress attempted to mitigate some of the inefficien-
cies and hardships of the final judgment rule by enacting the Inter-
locutory Appeals Act, now section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code.
8' Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted).
go Compare Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975), and Marco v. Dulles,
268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959), with Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974),
and Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1973).
1, This is the conclusion reached in Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546
F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and hinted at in Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977).
11 Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970)).
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The Act provides for interlocutory appeal of a carefully limited class
of orders. If, on timely motion, the district judge finds that (1) the
order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion as to that question; and (3) immedi-
ate appeal might materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, section 1292(b) directs that he "so state in writing in
such order."93 The court of appeals then has unfettered discretion
to either grant or refuse to-grant an appeal. 4
This certification procedure has not been widely used for ap-
peal of attorney disqualification orders, partly because most circuits
currently entertain appeals of right from orders granting or denying
disqualification.95 Judicial opinion varies in the scant caselaw on
certification of attorney disqualification rulings. The District of Col-
umbia Circuit has endorsed the use of section 1292(b),18 but the
Ninth Circuit, reversing an earlier endorsement," has recently held
that certification is an "improper avenue" for obtaining review of
denials of disqualification.98 The Tenth Circuit in one case enter-
tained an application for appeal from a disqualification denial but
exercised its discretion not to hear the certified question."
It is necessary to examine judicial interpretation of section
1292(b) in order to determine whether certification can substitute
for section 1291 appeal of orders denying disqualification. The sta-
tutory requirement that the order involve a "controlling question of
law" presents the most problems. A question is considered to be
"controlling" if it is "serious" to the conduct of the litigation ' and
,1 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
" The statute provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application
is made to it within ten days after entry of the order: Provided, however, that applica-
tion for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
Id.
,5 An order may be certified only if it is "not otherwise appealable."
" Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1028 & n.40 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
17 Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1964), clarified, 370 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1966).
Is Trone v. Smith, 553 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977).
" Waters v. Western Co. of N. Am., 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971) (dismissing appeal
as improvidently granted).
" Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974).
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if an erroneous ruling on the matter would constitute reversible error
on final appeal.'01 Although some courts have interpreted the con-
cept more restrictively, as meaning that a question is controlling
"only if it may contribute to the determination, at an early stage,
of a wide spectrum of cases, ' 102 this position is not supported by the
language of the statute or the legislative history. The Act makes no
reference to the effect of an appeal on other cases, and the Senate
Report on the legislation makes clear that the certification proce-
dure was designed to facilitate the course of the particular litigation,
rather than to supervise district courts or to set precedent. 11 3 Since
denials of disqualification are grounds for reversal if erroneous and
are clearly serious to the conduct of the case, the questions pre-
sented by disqualification motions are "controlling" questions.
More difficult is the question whether an issue of possible abuse
of discretion can amount to a "controlling question of law." Many
courts have held that section 1292(b) appeals cannot be maintained
"to test the propriety of a district judge's exercise of discretion."104
This position is consistent with the statutory language. When the
trial judge has wide discretion in applying general legal standards
to complicated factual situations, questions of fact and characteri-
zation of the facts, not questions of law, will largely predominate.
Moreover, the position, if not carried to restrictive extremes, ac-
cords with the legislative purpose. When abuse of discretion is the
standard of review, chances of reversal on appeal will be slight, and
interlocutory appeal will be likely to yield unproductive delay rather
than the expeditious conclusion that is supposed to result from
1292(b) appeal. The Second Circuit captured the crucial distinction
in A. Olnick & Sons v. Dempster Brothers, Inc. 105 It ruled that the
"I See generally Note, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A
Guided Tour through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 342 (1959).
0I Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (summarizing
Second Circuit precedent), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974). The Kohn position
does not accurately reflect Second Circuit practice. The Circuit's actual position is better
stated in A. Olnick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966), discussed in
text at notes 105-106 infra.
103 S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 8-10 (1958).
'" Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 765 (3d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). See also Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117; 119-20 (5th Cir.
1970); United States v. Salter, 421 F.2d 1393 (1st Cir. 1970); A. Olnick & Sons v. Dempster
Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 443 (2d Cir. 1966); Phelps v. Burnham, 327 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir.
1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1963) (per
curiam); 9 MooRE's, supra note 7, 110.22[2], at 261; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 518 (3d ed. 1976). But see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d
747, 752-56 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Note, Interlocutory Appeals in
the Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARv. L. REv. 607, 618 n.57 (1975).
105 365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966).
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"controlling question of law" requirement might be met where there
is some question whether the district court considered the proper
factors in reaching its conclusions, but not where the correct factors
were considered, with the wrong result."6 Under this approach, de-
nials of motions for counsel disqualification would present control-
ling questions of law only when the applicable ethical standards are
uncertain.
The second statutory criterion-that there be a substantial
ground for difference of opinion-has been little discussed and
seems to function only as a block to frivolous appeals. Unless he is
uncertain of the correctness of his ruling, a district judge will have
little reason to certify an order.07 It is therefore likely that this
condition will be satisfied whenever the other conditions are met.
The final requirement for section 1292(b) certification, which
has been called the "most basic,"'0 8 is that immediate appeal be
likely to advance materially the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion. This entails comparing the likely course of the litigation if
appeal is not immediately taken, on the one hand, with its probable
course if appeal is taken, on the other. In the attorney disqualifica-
tion context, the immediate consequence of interlocutory appeal
when the disqualification decision has been made on improper fac-
tors will be a delay, both during the appellate procedure and, as-
suming reversal, during the time needed for the district judge to
consider the motion under the proper standards. If the order is not
appealed immediately, however, reversal on appeal from final judg-
ment might lead to duplication of the entire proceeding, thus post-
poning "ultimate termination" even longer. Thus, the material ad-
vancement requirement presents no special obstacle to certification
of attorney disqualification questions.' 0
Application of the statutory criteria leads to the conclusion that
a small number of orders denying attorney disqualification, those
resting on standards of uncertain applicability, can be reviewed by
IN Id. at 442-43.
107 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754-55 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974).
I Note, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour
through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 343 (1959).
I" Whether termination of the litigation would be advanced by interlocutory appeal
depends in large part upon the stage of the litigation at which the motion for disqualification
was made and denied. Early in the process, before discovery and most pretrial maneuvering,
direct appeal, if resulting in reversal, would avoid duplicating lengthy litigation. Near the
close of the litigation little time would be saved. Termination of litigation is advanced only
in cases where the district court is reversed, but the certification procedure should ensure that
only cases with a substantial likelihood of reversal are appealed.
1978]
The University of Chicago Law Review
way of section 1292(b) certification. As a practical matter, Cohen
appeals frequently produce a similar result, for the appellate court
often will simply state the applicable legal rules and remand for the
district court to apply them.10 The distinction between 1292(b) ap-
peals and appeals of right is that 1292(b) appeals will be taken only
when district and appellate judges believe the appeal will materially
advance the litigation. Also, the application for a section 1292(b)
appeal does not perforce stay the district court proceedings."' The
appellant is not afforded the opportunity to harass his opponent and
delay the trial on trumped-up appeals. Because of these safeguards,
1292(b) appeal is superior to immediate appeal of right, at least in
the class of cases where it is available.112
B. Mandamus
The writ of mandamus is the least restricted mode of appellate
review. The statutory authority for its exercise, the All Writs Act,
broadly grants to the Supreme Court and other federal courts the
power to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.' 13 Review of interlocutory orders by way of mandamus dif-
fers in several important respects from section 1291 review under
Cohen. An appellate court has discretion to reject petitions for man-
damus without a hearing and upon submissions from the petitioner
only.' Concededly, section 1291 appeals may be summarily dis-
missed, but courts appear to give them more serious attention than
mandamus petitions because of the statutory obligation to hear
appeals."5 Perhaps even more important is that appellate courts
receive information with which to evaluate mandamus petitions.
The petitioner must specify the ground claimed to justify issuance
of the writ, together with a summary of the case and such parts of
10 See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th
Cir. 1977).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
1,2 This conclusion holds true even under the liberalized approach taken by the majority
in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 752-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1975), which would permit § 1292(b) appeals of orders involving trial judge discretion. The
safeguards of § 1292(b) would still impede dilatory appeals of right. See Ackerly v. Red Barn
Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1977): "[This Circuit has consistently maintained that the
collateral order doctrine should be sparingly applied, and that utilization of section 1292(b)
rather than relaxation of standards for mandatory appeals should be seen as the preferred
vehicle for seeking review of arguably interlocutory orders." Id. at 543 (footnote omitted).
113 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
HI FED. R. App. P. 21(a), (b).
I'5 See, e.g., 9 Mooma's, supra note 7, 110.10, at 136.
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the record as he may consider important. '"6 And because mandamus
petitions are given priority over other matters on the appellate
docket,1 7 courts can dispose of meritless petitions without delay. In
contrast, a notice of appeal contains no such information about the
case."' The appellant has ten days within which to order the trial
court record, which is to be delivered to the appellate court within
forty days."9 The appeal is then docketed' 2 and a briefing schedule
established; appellant's brief is generally due within forty days of
the filing of the record, appellee's brief thirty days after that, and
the appellant's reply brief within fourteen days of that.'2' Only then
does the appellate court have the information needed to assess the
worthiness of the appeal. Thus even summary dismissal of an ap-
peal takes far longer than denial of mandamus.
Because incontinent use of mandamus would subvert the final
judgment principle and disrupt ordinary appellate procedures,
courts traditionally have limited its usage to exceptional situa-
tions.' 22 Unfortunately, the resultant body of doctrine is replete with
conflicting formulations and confusing terminology, making it diffi-
cult to determine the propriety of mandamus in types of situations
not squarely addressed by existing precedent. That mandamus is
characterized by strict theory and loose practice further complicates
the problem.'1 Examination of the principal Supreme Court cases,
however, yields certain doctrinal principles with which to evaluate
the appropriateness of using the writ to review disqualification deni-
als.
1. Mandamus in the Supreme Court. Until the 1950s, the
Supreme Court took a highly restrictive view of the scope of proper
"' FED. R. APP. P. 21(a). This requirement may also have the psychological effect of
discouraging groundless petitions. See, e.g., 9 MooRE's, supra note 7, % 110.10, at 136.
"7 FED. R. APP. P. 23(b).
'" FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) requires only that "the notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from;
and shall name the court to which appeal is taken."
'I, FED. R. APP. P. 11(a).
120 FED. R. APP. P. 12(a).
2 FED. R. APP. P. 31(a).
'= C. WRIGHT, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF THE FEDERAL CoURTS § 102, at 516 (3d ed.
1976).
'1 Since the standards for use of mandamus are difficult to define precisely, courts and
parties are able to characterize erroneous orders of varying degrees of seriousness as "abuse
of discretion" or "usurpation of authority." Thus, courts hear cases not strictly appropriate
to mandamus even while enunciating strict standards. See, e.g., In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004,
1007 (5th Cir. 1975). That this is the prevailing practice is best shown by the prevalence of
judicial statements of concern about keeping the writ within proper limits. See, e.g., Bauman
v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 653-54 (4th Cir. 1977); A. Olnick & Sons v.
Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 445-48 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring).
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appellate use of mandamus to correct district court errors. 24 Even
so, the standards were ambiguous and thus open to manipulation
by courts and attorneys. It was said that mandamus was a way of
obliging courts "to do that justice which they are in duty, and by
virtue of their office, bound to do, 1' 25 and that "[i]t does not lie to
control judicial discretion," except to remedy trial court abuses
"outside of the exercise of [judicial] discretion, and outside the
jurisdiction of the court .... ,,,21 Even in such cases, doctrine held
that appellate courts should reserve the remedy for "extraordinary
causes," and should not interfere with decisions of a lower court on
jurisdictional questions that the lower court is competent to decide
and that are reviewable in the regular course of appeal.' 27 Manda-
mus was said not to be available "to perform the office of an ap-
peal-even if no appeal is given by law."'12 8
In 1957 in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,129 the Court expanded
the scope of mandamus when it approved the Seventh Circuit's
issuance of the writ to correct a district judge's erroneous referral of
a case to a special master. Rule 53 grants the district courts discre-
tion to make such referrals in "exceptional" cases.2 3 Thus, it was
arguable that the lower court had merely erred in its discretionary
determination that exceptional circumstances existed and that the
case was therefore an inappropriate one for use of mandamus. The
Supreme Court nevertheless found that use of mandamus had been
justified because "supervisory control of the District Courts by the
Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration."' 3'1
In support, the Court gave an expansive reading to the 1927 case Los
Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 32 quoting it to say that "'[w]here
the subject concerns the enforcement of the . . . [r]ules which by
law it is the duty of this Court to formulate and put into force,'
mandamus should issue to prevent such action thereunder so palpa-
bly improper as to place it beyond the scope of the rule invoked. ' 33
12 See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 595, 598-602 (1973).
"I Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879). See also Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,
319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
2 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879).
' Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947); In re Rice, 155 U.S. 396, 403 (1894)
("Mandamus cannot be issued to compel a lower court to decide a matter before it in a
particular way, or to review its judicial action had in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction").
22 In re Rice, 155 U.S. 396, 403 (1894).
12 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 53 ("reference to a master shall be an exception").
222 352 U.S. at 259-60.
,3 272 U.S. 701 (1927).
123 352 U.S. at 256 (quoting Los Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1927)).
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The Court emphasized that references to special masters were "all
too common in the Northern District of Illinois,' '1 4 suggesting per-
haps that the case only approves mandamus where a district judge
makes the same error repeatedly. But the Court seemed to imply
that proof of repeated errors is unnecessary, by saying "[b]ut even
'a little cloud may bring a flood's downpour' if we approve the
practice here indulged . "... "I One appellate court has remarked
that mandamus would be proper in "[e]xtraordinary circumstan-
ces . . .where the order under attack is characteristic of an erro-
neous practice likely to reoccur. ' '' 31 Indeed, La Buy might be
broadly read to support mandamus where a district court's order or
practice, although an exercise of its discretion, is so palpably impro-
per as to move the appellate court to exercise its supervisory author-
ity.'37
The Court's decision in Schlagenhauf v. Holder3' further
broadened the scope of the writ. In that case the district court was
alleged to have overreached its powers by ordering a defendant to
undergo a series of physical and mental examinations pursuant to
rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although reversing
the appellate court's view of the merits of the order, the Supreme
Court sanctioned its use of mandamus as a method of resolving an
important legal issue of first impression. This practice has become
known as "advisory" mandamus.
Whether these supervisory and advisory uses of mandamus sur-
vive the later case of Will v. United States3 ' is a matter of dispute
among the commentators. 4 ' Will disapproved the use of mandamus
"1 352 U.S. at 258 (quoting Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 235 F.2d 253, 257 (7th Cir.
1956)).
"1 352 U.S. at 258. Admittedly, the Court referred to past Seventh Circuit opinions
criticizing the practice of referrals to special masters and noted that Judge La Buy had
referred eleven cases in six years. Id. But, as observed in Note, Supervisory and Advisory
Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 H~Av. L. REV. 595, 609 (1973), the Court did not say
what proportion of possible referral cases were referred, or whether the number of cases
referred was unusually high. Significantly, the decision below, 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955),
makes no mention of the district court's repetition of the error. The dissent implies that Judge
La Buy's referral was not "a wholesale reference," nor "in accordance with or by reason of a
plan, practice, or custom." Id. at 713.
"I General Motors Corp. v. Lord, 488 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). See also United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297
(1972); Comment, The Use of Extraordinary Writs for Interlocutory Appeals, 44 TENN. L.
REV. 137, 146-56 (1976); Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act,
86 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608-12 (1973).
"I See Wright, The Difficult Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,771-
76 (1957) (calling the consequences of La Buy "truly breathtaking").
1- 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
139 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
"Io See, e.g., 9 MOORE'S, supra note 7, T 110.28, at 308-13; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
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to review a discovery order in a criminal case. The Court reiterated
the strict standards of the traditional cases, perhaps in an effort to
limit the effects of La Buy and Schlagenhauf. La Buy was described
in a footnote as "simply inapposite where there is no showing of a
persistent disregard of the federal rules." ' Schlagenhauf was de-
scribed in the same footnote as resting "squarely on the fact that
there was real doubt whether the District Court had any power at
all to order a defendant to submit to a physical examination."' 4 2 On
the other hand, the Will Court seemed to approve the basic premises
of those cases when it spoke of the "vital corrective and didactic
function" of the writ which "lay at the core" of La Buy and
Schlagenhauf.1 Moreover, in emphasizing the "added weight" of
the final judgment rule in criminal cases,"' and in distinguishing La
Buy and Schlagenhauf as civil cases, '45 the Court suggested-but
specifically did not hold' 4"-that there might be a more stringent
standard for the invocation of mandamus in criminal cases.'47 It
would therefore be premature to conclude that Will signalled a
wholesale retreat from the expansion represented by La Buy and
Schlagenhauf.'l
2. Mandamus to Review Orders Denying Motions to Disqual-
ify Counsel. The principles governing mandamus that have been
sanctioned by the Supreme Court might support use of the writ in
certain exceptional circumstances to review orders denying disqual-
ification. Schlagenhauf might be authority for using mandamus to
review a disqualification denial which involves the rare unsettled
THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 517 (3d ed 1976); Redish, The Pragmatic Approach
to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89, 115 (1975).
"1 389 U.S. at 104 n.14.
142 Id.
"1 Id. at 107.
'U Id. at 96.
, Id. at 100 n.16.
26Id.
' But see Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) which cites Will
as precedent in a civil case, without comment on the possible distinction.
14 See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 517 (3d ed.
1976). Two recent Supreme Court decisions regarding mandamus do not clarify the law. Kerr
v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976), affirmed the appellate court's refusal to
grant the writ to correct a discovery order where an alternative remedy was available. The
opinion repeated the standard doctrinal phrases, but the case required no further analysis.
The Court intimated that the courts of appeals have latitude in granting or denying the writ,
stating "it is important to remember that issuance of the writ is in large part a matter of
discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed." Id. at 403.
In Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), the Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit's decision not to issue mandamus to reverse the district court's remand of a
removed case to state court. The Court relied on the traditional use of mandamus to compel
a lower court to exercise its authority when it has the duty to do so. Id. at 352-53.
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question of law."' In such cases, mandamus would provide an alter-
native means of review where 1292(b) is appropriate and the district
judge fails to certify. 150 And although La Buy could be read to apply
only when a district judge repeatedly makes the same error, 5' the
case can be read more broadly as sanctioning mandamus as a means
of redressing gross abuses of judicial discretion. Thus, if a trial court
refused to disqualify in a very clear case for doing so, or denied a
disqualification motion in wholly cavalier fashion, mandamus
might lie under the La Buy case. But if La Buy is limited to cases
involving often-repeated error, or erroneous practices likely to be
repeated, then erroneous denials of disqualification will not be
remediable by supervisory mandamus unless the trial court's be-
havior is part of a persistent practice of disregarding the canons.
Beyond the fairly specific and limited situations in which either
supervisory or advisory mandamus is available, the Supreme Court
cases provide little guidance. If La Buy is given a restrictive inter-
pretation, the litigant aggrieved by a grossly erroneous denial of
disqualification might find succor in an early Supreme Court case
which, surprisingly in light of mandamus theory prevailing at the
time, suggested that mandamus will lie to correct flagrant trial
court error or misconduct. In Ex parte Burr52 the Court denied a
petition for a writ filed by an attorney who had been suspended from
practice before an inferior court. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that the Court was not inclined to intervene "unless
it were in a case where the conduct of the Circuit or District Court
was irregular, or was flagrantly improper.' 53 In Ex parte
Secom be,'54 on the other hand, Chief Justice Taney wrote on behalf
of the Court that mandamus was not available to review an attor-
ney's disbarment, no matter how erroneous the decision may have
been. He commented that the Court was not aware of any case
where mandamus had issued to a lower court "commanding it to
reverse or annul its decision, where the decision was in its nature a
judicial act, and within the scope of its jurisdiction and discre-
tion.' 5 5 As rulings on disqualification motions are generally said to
"' See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L.
Rv. 595, 613-19 (1973).
"' The circuits do not agree on whether a motion for certification under § 1292(b) and
denial of it by the district judge are prerequisites to petitioning for mandamus. See 9
MOORE'S, supra note 7, 110.22[5], at 267.
"I, See text and notes at notes 134-36 supra.
,5' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824).
' Id. at 530. Since suspension and disqualification are similar means of regulating the
conduct of the Bar, the Court's analysis should apply to disqualifications as well.
' 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1857).
01 Id. at 15.
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be within the discretion of the district court, this position seems to
undercut the Burr dictum unless a petitioner could successfully
argue that a particular denial of disqualification was so "flagrantly
improper" as to be beyond the scope of the district court's discre-
tion.
The caselaw in the courts of appeals reflects the lack of specific
guidance from the Supreme Court. Some circuits have adopted
strict formulations of the prerequisites for mandamus,' 6 while oth-
ers employ more liberal formulations. '57 An observer of appeals court
practice might be inclined to agree with the dissenting judge in
United States v. DiStefano18 that issuance of the writ depends in
fact not upon ambiguous doctrinal statements in the Supreme
Court cases, but upon "the importance the reviewing judges place
upon the need for corrective action, and how serious they view the
effect of their failure to act." '59 A pragmatic approach to mandamus
might be justified on the view that the opinion just quoted accur-
ately describes the Supreme Court's decisions on mandamus as
well. On this view, Schlagenhauf and La Buy (the Will opinion
notwithstanding) are better viewed not as doctrinal pronounce-
ments but as examples of a pragmatic approach in action.
In the recent case of Bauman v. United States District Court,160
the Ninth Circuit carefully articulated "guiding principles" for use
of mandamus in an attempt to bring some needed clarity to the law.
Five indicators favoring the use of mandamus were listed:
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means,
such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires
... (2) The petitioners will be damaged or prejudiced in a
way not correctable on appeal. . . .(3) The district court's
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. . . . (4) The
district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a
persistent disregard of the federal rules. . . .(5) The district
court's order raises new and important problems, or issues of
law of first impression.'6 '
151 See, e.g., Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. DiSte-
fano, 464 F.2d 845, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1972).
,3T See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970),
aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (granting mandamus in a
case of "substantial importance to the administration of justice" where ultimate appeal
would be "an inadequate remedy").
,' 464 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 853 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
,SO 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977).
,' Id. at 654-55 (citations omitted).
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Recognizing that "proper disposition will often require a balancing
of conflicting indicators," the court termed the guiding principles
"cumulative"-none of them being singly dispositive of the issue.'62
A court of appeals applying these guidelines might issue the
writ to correct a trial court's egregious error in denying a motion for
disqualification. Where the Silver Chrysler rule is rejected and certi-
fication under 1292(b) denied, the first criterion would be met. The
second criterion would be satisfied in the rare case in which special
circumstances indicate that immediate disqualification is necessary
adequately to protect the petitioner's interests. This determination
is crucial, because the possibility of adequate relief upon appeal
from final judgment eliminates the need for any mode of appellate
review of the interlocutory order. Where the order is clearly wrong,
the third criterion would be met."6 3 Presence of the fourth or fifth
indicators, reflecting the "supervisory" and "advisory" uses of man-
damus respectively, would strengthen the case for mandamus.
Use of mandamus in these sorts of attorney disqualification
cases would not be out of line with current uses of mandamus to
review other types of interlocutory orders. Mandamus is used to
review, for example, discovery orders granting parties access to al-
legedly privileged documents;'64 discovery orders requiring produc-
tion of financial and tax records and attorney payment agree-
ments;' 5 protective orders;'66 orders denying the right to depose;'6
orders convening a three-judge court;' 8 orders disqualifying
judges;' 9 orders granting retrial; 7' orders restraining parties and
others from discussion of a pending case;' 7' and orders notifying
162 Id.
11 See Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley, 439 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1971): "[M]andamus is
required since it is the only way in which the appellate court can correct the egregious error
of the district court. . . ." Id. at 1034 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
'" Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per
curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
'- Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914
(1975).
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1976).
" Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972).
,' Knight v. Alsop, 535 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1976).
SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117-18 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Rodgers, 537
F.2d 1196, 1197 n.1 (4th Cir. 1976); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1966).
But see Action Realty Co. v. Will, 427 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1970); Albert v. United States Dist.
Court, 283 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 (1961).
70 In re United States, No. 77-1267 (1st Cir., Nov. 8, 1977); Peterman v. Chicago, R.I.
& P.R.R., 493 F.2d 88, 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974); Grace Lines, Inc. v.
Motley, 439 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1971). But see General Motors Corp. v. Lord, 488 F.2d 1096,
1099-1100 (8th Cir. 1973); Thorn v. Parkland Chevrolet Co., 416 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1969).
M7 CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 1975).
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potential class members of a pending class action.'72 Although man-
damus has been used in these situations, the practice does not ex-
tend indiscriminately to every instance of an order within the cate-
gories. Indeed, the courts generally decline mandamus review, re-
serving the writ for the special hardship case.' This is consistent
with the Supreme Court's admonition in Will v. United States'74
that courts "be careful lest they suffer themselves to be misled by
labels such as 'abuse of discretion' and 'want of power' into interlo-
cutory review of nonappealable orders on the mere ground that they
be erroneous.' 1 75
Because vesting the appellate courts with mandatory jurisdic-
tion of interlocutory appeals from orders denying disqualification
increases the opportunity for abuse, parties aggrieved by such orders
should be relegated instead to the remedy of mandamus, so that the
appellate courts could decline to review all but those orders espe-
cially deserving of attention. Whatever the evils of expanded use of
mandamus in general, use of the writ as a substitute for Cohen
appeals in these cases is a move toward judicial economy. While the
stricter traditional view of mandamus might make the writ unavail-
able in attorney disqualification cases, recent cases and the logic
underlying them seem to support its use, at least in instances of
egregious error. Indeed, both circuits that have rejected the majority
view that these orders are appealable by right have endorsed the use
of mandamus as an alternative.'
"I Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1975).
For additional instances of use of mandamus to review interlocutory orders see the cases
collected in 9 MooRE's, supra note 7, 110.28, at 309-11.
"I The Sixth Circuit, for example, requires a showing of "the most extreme circumstan-
ces" to justify the writ. See Comment, The Use of Extraordinary Writs for Interlocutory
Appeals, 44 TENN. L. REv. 137, 156 (1976). See generally Community Broadcasting of Boston,
Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1028 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 9 MooRE's, supra note 7, 110.28, at
308-13.
' 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
' s Id. at 98 n.6.
Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Chugach Elec. Ass'n. v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 820 (1967); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964), clarified, 370 F.2d 418 (9th
Cir. 1966). Cf. In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (the court articulated a strict
standard for the grant of mandamus, but nevertheless issued the writ where the district judge
improperly refused to allow a particular attorney to appear in the case pro hac vice). The
parallel to appeals from orders denying motions for disqualification of counsel on ethical
grounds seems clear.
No reported decision holding mandamus inappropriate has been found, except insofar
as direct appealability under the Silver Chrysler rule necessarily entails rejection of manda-
mus. In United States v. Hankish, 462 F.2d 316, 318-19 (4th Cir. 1972), the court rejected a
petition for mandamus to review a lower court's grant of a motion to disqualify. The court
suggested, rightly, that an appeal would be the proper avenue of review.
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CONCLUSION
Mandamus, the Cohen collateral order exception, and certifica-
tion of interlocutory orders under section 1292(b) are various means
of ameliorating the sometimes harsh effects of the final judgment
rule. Unfortunately, these modes of review were fashioned without
reference to one another. The occasions for their use overlap, criteria
relevant to the availability of one are imported into tests for availa-
bility of another, and the priorities accorded their use seem mis-
placed. Appeal of right from interlocutory orders is the least appro-
priate mode of review, because it offers the greatest opportunity for
harassment and delay. Discretionary appeals under section 1292(b)
should be more common, used freely whenever immediate appellate
guidance on a controlling question of law would expedite the con-
duct of trial litigation. Mandamus should also be preferred to ap-
peal by right because it provides a means of controlling delaying
tactics and enables appellate courts to review interlocutory orders
on a selective basis; appellate attention would be necessary only if
the district court erred egregiously. Peculiarly, however, the Su-
preme Court has been relatively hospitable to claims of appealabil-
ity under Cohen, and relatively hostile to the use of mandamus."'
District judges certify questions under section 1292(b) so infre-
quently that the statute has had little effect.17 8
Current practice regarding review of orders denying motions for
disqualification of counsel illustrates these skewed priorities. If
standards for disqualification are at issue, the order should be certi-
fied under 1292(b). In special circumstances, a trial court's egre-
gious error in failing to disqualify can be corrected by mandamus.
If the order is merely erroneous, the petitioner should be required
to await final judgment, as in the cases of so many other interlocu-
tory orders. But the majority of the circuits hear section 1291 ap-
peals under Cohen instead of selectively using certification and
mandamus. That position should be rejected, regardless of the
availability of alternative modes of interlocutory review. In the dis-
qualification context, the cost to the judicial system of appeal by
" Compare Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), and Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950),
with Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); Will v. United States, 389 U.S.
90 (1967); and Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
" For example, in fiscal year 1974, 16,436 appeals were taken by the circuits, while only
about one hundred appeals are certified each year under section 1292(b), half of them taken
by the courts of appeals. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF T1HE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at
518-19 (3d ed. 1976). Nor are mandamus cases common. See Redish, The Pragmatic Ap-
proach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89, 115 n.149 (1975).
19781
482 The University of Chicago Law Review [45:450
right outweighs its occasional benefit to an unjustly denied movant,
who still retains his right to eventual relief upon final judgment.
Justice is sometimes neither quick nor sweet. But an attempt to
hasten it is doomed to fail when it creates an unrestricted opportun-
ity for litigants to harass an adversary and delay a trial.
Michael W. McConnell
